Who knows how? Reexamining know-how attributions in context

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Published Dec 28, 2023
DOI https://doi.org/10.29035/pyr.24.15

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Felipe Morales-Carbonell
Universidad de Chile, Chile
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5492-0759

Abstract

The debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowhow rages on. Kevin Wallbridge (2021) has argued that certain patterns of know-how attribution can be explained by a contextualist intellectualist theory (subject-specific intellectualism). In this paper, I examine Wallbridge’s proposal and argue that anti-intellectualists can also explain the data by appealing to the role of context in the attribution of ability.



Article Details

Issue
No 24 (2023): Palabra y Razón
Section
Artículos Dossier
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